Broward v. Environmental Protection Agency: CERCLA\u27s Bar on Pre-Enforcement Review of EPA Cleanups under Section 113(h) by Ruggieri, Robert G.
Volume 13 Issue 2 Article 7 
2002 
Broward v. Environmental Protection Agency: CERCLA's Bar on 
Pre-Enforcement Review of EPA Cleanups under Section 113(h) 
Robert G. Ruggieri 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert G. Ruggieri, Broward v. Environmental Protection Agency: CERCLA's Bar on Pre-Enforcement 
Review of EPA Cleanups under Section 113(h), 13 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 375 (2002). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol13/iss2/7 
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Environmental Law Journal by an authorized 
editor of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
2002]
BROWARD v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY.
CERCLA's BAR ON PRE-ENFORCEMENT REVIEW OF EPA
CLEANUPS UNDER SECTION 113(h)
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in December
of 1980 as a means to cope with the most heavily polluted hazard-
ous waste sites in the country.1 The ultimate goal of the statute is to
protect the natural environment and save human lives by facilitat-
ing the cleanup of environmental contamination and imposing
costs on the responsible parties.2 Intending to ensure prompt
cleanup of contaminated sites, Congress amended CERCLA in 1986
to include a timing provision, 42 U.S.C. section 9613(h) (CERCLA
section 113 (h)), that bars federal district courts from reviewing cer-
tain Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) actions before they
are completed. 3
Since the addition of section 113(h), courts have reached dif-
ferent conclusions regarding the extent of the provision's bar on
immediate review of challenges to CERCLA cleanups. 4 While a ma-
jority of courts agree that all claims should be barred, a minority of
courts maintain that review should be available to claims when a
1. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994) [hereinafter CERCLA] (providing comprehen-
sive federal program for cleanup of abandoned hazardous waste sites throughout
United States). For a further discussion of CERCLA, see infra notes 40-62 and ac-
companying text. See alsoJonathan N. Reiter, Comment, CERCLA Section 113(h) &
RCRA Citizen Suits: To Bar or Not to Bar? 17 UCLAJ. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 207, 208
(1999). CERC[A attacks environmental problems on two fronts, first holding po-
tentially reliable parties strictly liable for conduct involving hazardous substances;
and second, establishing a trust fund, known as the Superfund, that the Environ-
mental Protection Agency [hereinafter EPA] utilizes to finance remedial and re-
moval efforts. See id.
2. See Reiter, supra note 1 at 208 (noting CERCLA and similar state laws were
created to identify sites, clean them up, and hold those responsible for contamina-
tion financially accountable).
3. See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-499, § 113(h), 100 Stat. 1613 [hereinafter SARA] (furthering goals of CERCLA
by preventing delays of removal and remedial actions).
4. See Michael P. Healy, The Effectiveness and Fairness of Superfund's Judicial Re-
view Preclusion Provision, 15 VA. ENvTL. LJ. 271, 307 (1996) (arguing CERCLA
should be amended to provide pre-enforcement review of claims when interests
harmed outweigh interest in foreclosing CERCLA review prior to implementation
or enforcement).
(375)
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delayed review would be inadequate or contrary to the ultimate
objectives of CERCLA. 5
This Note, through an analysis of the District Court of South-
ern Florida's decision in Broward Garden Tenant's Ass'n v. EPA (Brow-
ard),6 discusses whether CERCLA unconditionally bars citizens
from challenging remedies selected by EPA under the statute. Sec-
tion II summarizes the facts of Broward.7 Section III examines the
history of section 113 (h) and the relevant law surrounding its appli-
cation.8 Section IV explains the District Court of Southern Flor-
ida's holding and rationale. 9 Section V provides a critical analysis
of the court's determination that section 113(h) bars federal juris-
diction over pre-enforcement review of all challenges to EPA reme-
dial actions.10 Section V also discusses whether the Broward holding
was consistent with recent court decisions, congressional intent,
and good environmental policy.1' Finally, Section VI discusses the
impact and future effects of the Broward decision. 12
II. FACTS
The City of Fort Lauderdale purchased land that was to be-
come the Wingate Superfund Site (Wingate Site) in 1951.13 Three
years later, the city began operating the Wingate Site as an incinera-
tor and landfill and continued to do so until it closed the site in
5. See id. (noting minority of courts have expressly or impliedly concluded
review of non-liability based CERCLA claims should be available prior to imple-
mentation of cleanups).
6. 157 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2001) [hereinafter Broward].
7. For a discussion of Broward facts, see infra notes 13-39 and accompanying
text.
8. For a discussion of CERCLA and the statutory and judicial background of
42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (CERCLA § 113(h), see infra notes 40-113 and accompanying
text.
9. For a narrative analysis of the Broward decision, see infra notes 114-136 and
accompanying text.
10. For a critical analysis of the Broward decision, see infra notes 137-168 and
accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of how the Broward decision fits in with other recent court
decisions, congressional intent and good environmental policy, see infra notes 137-
168 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the impact of the Broward decision upon federal juris-
prudence, see infta notes 169-174 and accompanying text.
13. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2001). The Wingate
Road Municipal Incinerator Dump covered sixty-one acres in Fort Lauderdale,
Broward County, Florida. See EPA: NPL Site Narrative at Listing, at http://
www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl/nar428.htm (last updated Oct. 4, 1989). The
site included an incinerator, offices, and an approximately forty-acre disposal area,
all owned and operated by the City of Fort Lauderdale. See id. Property in the
surrounding area was used for a combination of residential, commercial, and in-
dustrial purposes. See id.
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June of 1978.14 Broward Gardens, a public housing complex con-
structed by Fort Lauderdale in the 197 0s, is located within a quar-
ter-mile of the Wingate Site. 15 The population of Broward Gardens
is approximately ninety-nine percent African-American. 16
EPA placed the Wingate Site on its National Priorities List
(NPL) in 1989 after conducting initial environmental studies of the
site.1 7 The following year the State Health Department of Florida
conducted a preliminary health study and found cancer levels were
higher in the areas surrounding the Wingate Site than in any other
part of Broward County. 18 After conducting additional studies of
the site and soliciting public comments, EPA developed a proposed
remedial plan to cleanup the site. 19
In 1995, after reviewing the proposed remedial plan, the Flor-
ida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) sent a letter
to EPA addressing a list of ten concerns with EPA's cleanup plan. 20
Among the concerns was EPA's use of a level to quantify the cancer
risk factor that was less stringent than the level accepted by the
state.21 Despite FDEP's continued protests, EPA used the original
risk factor in its final proposal. 22
14. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1333. The city began operating a second
incinerator at the Wingate Site with a cooling-water pond in 1966. See id. Ash
contained in the cooling-water spread into the ground in the disposal area contrib-
uting to the pollution of the site. See EPA: Florida NPL Site Summaries, Wingate Road
Municipal Incinerator Dump Study, at http://www.epa.gov/region4/waste/npl/
nplfls/wingatfl. htm (last updated Sept. 15, 2000) [hereinafter EPA: Florida NPL
Summaries] (providing history of Wingate Site).
15. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1333. Broward Gardens was planned and
subsidized by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
[hereinafter HUD] pursuant to the United States Housing Act of 1937. See id.
16. See id. Plaintiffs cited the racial composition of Broward Gardens to sup-
port their claim that the final consent decree perpetuated racial segregation. See
id. at 1335.
17. See id. at 1333-34. The National Priorities List [hereinafter NPL] is a list of
highly prioritized hazardous waste sites. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1994).
18. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1334. It was determined that the Wingate
Site exposed nearby residents to hazardous contaminants, such as dioxin and arse-
nic, when it released them into the atmosphere and soil. See id. The area's drink-
ing water and fish were also affected by these contaminants. See also EPA: Florida
NPL Site Summaries, supra note 14.
19. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1334. CERCLA gives EPA the authority to
provide for remedial action relating to hazardous substances whenever a hazard-
ous substance is released or when there is a substantial threat of such a release. See
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1994).
20. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1334 (referring to one of several non-par-
ties voicing concern over EPA's proposed remedial plan).
21. See id. EPA was using a factor of 1 X 10-4, while the Florida Department of
Environmental Protection [FDEP] required a level of 1 X 10 -6. See id.
22. See id. (noting risk factor used in EPA's proposal was same used in final
consent decree).
20021
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On September 11, 1998, pursuant to section 122 of CERCLA,
EPA filed a consent decree in the District Court of Southern Flor-
ida.23 EPA also solicited public comments on the proposals con-
tained in the decree pursuant to CERCLA section 117(a) (1).24 In
October 1998, several parties, including the Legal Aid Services of
Broward County, Inc. (LAS) and the Legal Environmental Assis-
tance Foundation (LEAS), submitted comments challenging the
adequacy of the proposed remedy for the Wingate Site. 25 Among
the comments were concerns that the proposed remedial action did
not require soil cleanup to the degree required by Florida law and
23. See id. at 1335 (citing United States v. Fort Lauderdale, 81 F. Supp. 2d
1348 (S.D. Fla. 1999)). A summary of EPA's remedial actions contained in the
consent decree is as follows:
1. excavation of contaminated soil and incinerator ash in the southern
twenty acres of the site, which exceed the EPA's risk threshold, and
disposal of adjacent landfill;
2. drainage, treatment, and disposal of water in the abutting lake and
excavation of the lake's contaminated sediments;
3. construction of a geosynthetic cap with erosion controls over the
landfill;
4. institutional controls to maintain the site cap, control storm water, and
provide for the installation of fencing and signs;
5. institutional controls and/or groundwater use restrictions within the
site boundary;
6. storm water management;
7. natural attenuation of contamination for the surface water at abutting
lake;
8. ground water, surface water, sediment, and fish tissue monitoring.
Id. at 1334-35; see generally EPA: Florida NPL Site Summaries, supra note 14 (detailing
cleanup process).
24. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1335; 42 U.S.C. § 9617(a) (CERCLA
§ 113(h)) provides:
(a) Proposed plan
Before adoption of any plan for remedial action to be undertaken... [an
appointed person] . . . shall take both of the following actions:
(1) Publish a notice and brief analysis of the proposed plan and make
such plan available to the public.
(2) Provide a reasonable opportunity for submission of written and oral
comments and an opportunity for a public meeting at or near the facility
at issue regarding the proposed plan and regarding any proposed find-
ings ... relating to cleanup standard[s].
The notice and analysis published under paragraph (1) shall include suf-
ficient information as may be necessary to provide a reasonable explana-
tion of the proposed plan and alternative proposals considered.
(b) Final plan
Notice of the final remedial action plan adopted shall be published and
... made available to the public before commencement of any remedial
action. Such final plan shall be accompanied by a discussion of any sig-
nificant changes (and the reasons for such changes) ....
42 U.S.C. § 9617(a) (1995).
25. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1334-35 (referring to two of large number
of parties that submitted comments challenging proposed remedy pursuant to
§ 117).
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that the remedial action did not assure protection of human health
with respect to carcinogenic concentrations of arsenic and dioxin. 26
Following the mandatory public comment period, the United
States moved to enter the consent decree between EPA and Fort
Lauderdale. 27 The consent decree contained the final plan of the
remedial action, which in all relevant parts, was the same as the
proposed plan.28 Several non-parties residing in close proximity to
the Wingate Site challenged the adequacy of the selected remedy
and opposed the United States' motion to enter the consent de-
cree.29 In United States v. Fort Lauderdale (Fort Lauderdale),30 the Dis-
trict Court of Southern Florida held that according to CERCLA, the
non-parties did not have standing, and the court's scope of review
was limited to a determination of whether the consent decree com-
plied with the law. 31 As a result, the court entered the consent de-
cree.32 Shortly thereafter, EPA and Fort Lauderdale implemented
the remedial action as outlined in the consent decree. 33
After the cleanup began, the Broward Garden Tenants Associa-
tion (Plaintiffs) brought an action against EPA and Fort Lauderdale
(Defendants) for declaratory and injunctive relief from the consent
decree.34 Plaintiffs claimed that the remedial cleanup plan con-
26. See id. Legal Aid Services of Broward County, Inc. [hereinafter LAS] and
Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation [hereinafter LEAS] also believed that
the plan omitted certain contaminated areas of the Wingate Site and as a result of
the plan's inadequacies the site would never be removed from the NPL. See id.
27. See id. (recognizing EPA made no significant changes to proposed reme-
dial plan).
28. See id. at 1334. According to CERCLA § 117(a), EPA is not required to
amend a remedial plan in response to significant public comments and criticisms.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9617(a). For the wording of 42 U.S.C. § 9617(a) (CERCLA
§ 117(a)), see supra note 24.
29. See Fort Lauderdale, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 1999). The non-
parties included Bass-Dillard Neighborhood Issues and Prevention, Inc., and indi-
viduals Curtis Brown, Caroyln Young, and Hamilton Forman. See id.
30. 81 F. Supp. 2d 1348 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
31. Id. at 1349 (noting consent decree was reasonable and was adequate to
protect public health and environment).
32. See id. at 1353 (stating court would not substitute its judgment for EPA's
regarding reasonableness of decree or adequacy to protect public health and
environment).
33. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1334-35 (referring to $20 million remedial
plan currently being implemented).
34. See id. at 1336. In March of 1999 Judge William P. Dimitrouleas of the
Southern District of Florida entered the consent decree in Fort Lauderdale, 81 F.
Supp. 2d at 1348. The parties to this lawsuit agreed upon a consent decree, and
included an agreement as to payments totaling approximately $20 million from
the various defendants to pay for the remedial action. See id. Defendants also
include officers of EPA, Administrator Christine Whitman and Acting Regional
Administrator, Region IV A. Stanley Meiburg, and HUD. See Broward, 157 F. Supp.
2d at 1332. The tenants association is an organization composed of residents liv-
2002]
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tamined in the consent decree was not an adequate remedy for the
high level of toxins and pollutants at the Wingate Site, and that by
following the inadequate cleanup plan EPA and the city were, in
effect, perpetuating racial segregation.3 5 Plaintiffs' objections to
the remedial plan included those previously made by FDEP, LAS,
and LEAS as well as objections to the "cap and leave" remedy,
whereby a plastic cap is used to cover a contaminated area.3 6
Defendants in Broward moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' suit for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to section 113(h) of CER-
CLA.3 7 The District Court of Southern Florida granted the motion,
finding that Plaintiffs' desired remedy, the prevention of an EPA
remedial action, conflicted with the intent of section 113(h).38 The
court determined that the relief sought by Plaintiffs would directly
interfere with and delay the cleanup plan, the very problem section
113(h) was intended to prevent.39
ing in the Broward Gardens Complex in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Id. Plaintiffs
also include individual adult residents of Broward Gardens. See id.
35. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1332. The Plaintiffs filed a seven-count
complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging: Count I, violation of the
Fifth Amendment (against EPA); count II, violation of the Thirteenth Amendment
and 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (against Fort Lauderdale); count III, violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against Fort Lauderdale); count IV, vio-
lation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (against Fort Lauderdale); count V,
violation of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (against EPA, Fort Lauderdale,
and former EPA Administrator Browner, and former Regional Director of Region
IV, Hankinson); count VI, violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1304 et
seq. (against HUD); and count VII, violation of the Fifth Amendment (against
Browner and Hankinson). See id.
36. See id. at 1335. EPA often "caps" a landfill with an impermeable layer, and
installs drains and gas collection systems to contain contamination. See EPA:
Superfund Cleanup Tools, at http://www.epa.gov/oerrpage/superfund/accomp/
400/tools.htm (last updated Feb. 1, 2001). Plaintiffs claim that the plastic cap will
be ineffective and should be withdrawn, as was done for the Stauffer Chemical
Superfund Site in Tarpon Springs, Florida, an area that has a 93.3% white popula-
tion. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1335.
37. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1337. As grounds for their motion to dis-
miss, the federal Defendants contended that: (1) the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to § 113(h) of CERCLA, (2) the Plaintiffs
lacked Article III standing to bring their claims, (3) Defendants were immune
from suit, and (4) the claims against HUD were barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. See id. at 1332-33. "Like the federal [D]efendants, [Fort Lauderdale]
argue[d] that the complaint had to be dismissed under § [113(h)] of CERCLA."
Id. at 1333. Fort Lauderdale also claimed that: (1) Plaintiffs failed to properly
effect service of process upon the city and, therefore, the court lacked personaljurisdiction over the City, (2) the complaint failed to state a claim upon which
relief could have been granted, and (3) the Tenants Association did not have
standing to bring the claims alleged in the complaint. See id.
38. See id. at 1335-37 (finding challenge would delay cleanup).
39. See id. at 1329 (holding it lacked jurisdiction to review challenge to EPA
remedial cleanup plan prior to its completion).
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III. BACKGROUND
In December 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA to enable EPA
to quickly and effectively respond to environmental problems re-
sulting from the release of hazardous waste. 40 The purpose of CER-
CLA is to provide an effective mechanism for cleaning up
environmental hazards as quickly as possible and to ensure that par-
ties responsible for the problems bear as much of the cleanup ex-
pense as possible. 41 To meet this end, CERCLA provides federal
funds to ensure the cleanup of hazardous substances and federal
authority to recover cleanup costs from those responsible for the
contamination.42 Congress also created a Superfund to pay for
those cleanups for which no solvent responsible party could be
found. 43 Congress structured CERCLA so that cleanup operations
can be implemented independently of any imposition of liability or
recovery of costs from liable parties. 44
CERCLA provides EPA with two types of response actions for
treating a release of a hazardous substance into the environment.45
40. See Healy, supra note 4, at 273 (citing United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem.
Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982)). A release, as defined in CER-
CLA, includes "any spilling, leaking; pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, dis-
charging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the
environment .. " 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1994).
41. See Healy, supra note 4, at 273. CERCLA includes provisions for establish-
ing liability for the costs of cleaning up hazardous waste sites. See Lucia A.
Silecchia, Judicial Review of CERCLA Cleanup Procedures: Striking a Balance to Prevent
Irreparable Harm, 20 HARv. ENrL. L. REv. 339, 340 (1996).
The Superfund cleanup process begins with site discovery or notification
to EPA of possible releases of hazardous substances .... Once discovered,
sites are entered into the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Information System (CERCLIS), EPA's comput-
erized inventory of potential hazardous substance release sites. EPA then
evaluates the potential for a release of hazardous substances from the site
42. EPA: Superfund Sites Cleanup Process, at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/ac-
tion/process/sfproces.htm (last updated Mar. 28, 2001).
See Healy, supra note 4, at 273. The federal funding of CERC[A was increased by
subsequent statutes to allow the federal government to begin cleanup of sites that
need urgent attention. See id.
43. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1994) (regulating use of Superfund
money). The Superfund itself is "a trust fund fueled by taxes on the oil and pe-
trochemical industries, corporations, and general revenues, to be used to clean up
releases of hazardous substances into the environment." Alfred R. Light, The Im-
portance of "Being Taken": To Clarify and Confirm the Litigative Reconstruction of CER-
CLA's Text, 18 B.C. ENVrL. ArF. L. REv. 1, 1 n.1 (1990) (discussing inconsistent
interpretations of CERCLA).
44. See Healy, supra note 4, at 274 (stating "[t]he enforcement provisions and
mechanisms included in CERCLA are based on a 'polluter pays' principle").
45. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1994) (defining terms "respond" and
"response").
2002]
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The first response option is a removal action, a short-term response
intended to "prevent, minimize, stabilize, mitigate or eliminate the
release or threat of a release. '46 In order to allow for an immediate
response and abatement of the problem, removal actions are usu-
ally limited in cost and time, and may be pursued without the com-
pletion of a substantial administrative process. 47 EPA's preferred
remedy, however, is a remedial action, a cleanup designed to
achieve a permanent remedy at the site.48 Due to substantial costs
as well as a complex and time consuming process of funding, select-
ing and implementing remedial actions, only a small number of
remedial actions have been completed since CERCLA's
enactment. 4
9
In the 1980s certain limitations of CERC[A became appar-
ent.50 Expedited CERCLA cleanups were rare events, as they were
often delayed by lawsuits in which Potentially Responsible Parties
(PRPs) challenged their liability and financial contribution. 51
These lawsuits diverted EPA's efforts and the Superfund's finances
away from the goals of the statute and toward litigation.52 Addition-
ally, the time spent on litigation often affected the ultimate success
46. Healy, supra note 4, at 274 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (defining term
"removal")). Removal actions may include forms of site control, installation of
drainage controls, and removal of leaking drums. See id. at 274-75.
47. See id. at 275 (claiming EPA removal actions are one of CERCLA's most
valuable contributions to human health and environment); see also EPA: Superfund
Cleanup Figures, at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/action/process/mgmtrpt.htm.
(last updated Mar. 28, 2001) (reporting over 6,400 removal actions were taken at
hazardous waste sites to immediately reduce threat to public health and
environment).
48. See Healy, supra note 4, at 275. "The 1986 Amendments to CERCLA estab-
lish a preference for permanent, treatment-based remedies." Id. at 275-76 (citing
42 U.S.C. § 9621 (b) (1) (1994)). Remedial actions include removal actions, as well
as mechanisms to collect runoff, the treatment or incineration of hazardous sub-
stances at the site, and reasonable monitoring to ensure the adequacy of the
remediation effort. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994)).
49. See id. at 276 (reporting average cost of remedial action is between $25
and $30 million per site).
50. See Reiter, supra note 1, at 208 (citing Michael Oxley, Superfund Reform: A
Solution or a Sellout? Making It Work, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1995, at B4 (blaming
limitations on high costs and inefficient site construction work)).
51. See Reiter, supra note 1, at 208 (explaining such litigation and how incum-
bent costs diverted money away from CERCLA's primary objective).
52. See id. "Nearly half of Superfund money is frittered away on litigation,
bureaucracy and studies. Only 53 percent of funds are spent actually cleaning up
sites. .. ." Id. (quoting Oxley, supra note 50, at B4).
8
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of some cleanups, as the delays prevented attempts to minimize or
mitigate the spreading of the released hazardous materials.5 3
To reduce the frequency of dilatory litigation and other limita-
tions of CERCLA, Congress amended the statute in 1986 when it
passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA). 54 SARA includes section 113(h), a provision that "places
strict limitations on the timing of pre-enforcement judicial review
of ordered cleanups." 55 The provision denies federal courts juris-
diction over challenges concerning removal and remedial actions
before those actions are completed, unless the challenge is one of
the five specific exceptions identified by the statute. 56 Section
113(h) reflects CERCLA's philosophy of "clean up first, litigate
later."57 Congress recognized that allowing immediate review of
53. See id. "[I]f courts permit challenges to proceed at ongoing CERCLA
sites, cleanup efforts may be unacceptably delayed, having the potential effect of
further contaminating those sites and threatening human lives." Id. at 209.
54. See Silecchia, supra note 41, at 340. SARA became effective on October
17, 1986. See id. at n.6.
55. Id. at 342. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) provides:
(h) Timing of Review
No Federal Court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law other than
under section 1332 of Title 28 (relating to diversity of citizenship jurisdic-
tion) or under State law which is applicable or relevant and appropriate
under section 9621 of this tide (relating to cleanup standards) to review
any challenges to removal or remedial action selected under section 9604
of this title, or to review any order issued under section 9606(a) of this
title ....
42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1994).
56. See Healy, supra note 4, at 286. The exceptions to the preclusion of review
are:
(1) An action under section 9607 of this title to recover response costs or
damages for contribution.
(2) An action to enforce an order issued under section 9606(a) of this
title or to recover a penalty for violation of such order.
(3)An action for reimbursement under section 9606(b) (2) of this title.
(4) An action under 9659 of this title (relating to citizens suits) alleging
that the removal or remedial action taken under section 9604 of this title
or secured under section 9606 of this title was in violation of any require-
ment of this chapter. Such an action may not be brought with regard to a
removal where a remedial action is to be undertaken at the site.
(5) An action under section 9606 of this title in which the United States
has moved to compel a remedial action.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).
57. Silecchia, supra note 41, at 351-53. Section 113(h) essentially ratified a
line of earlier federal court decisions that foreclosed judicial review prior to gov-
ernment enforcement actions. See id. In § 113(h), Congress intended to enact a
uniform rule barring pre-enforcement review of CERCLA cleanups so that they
could be pursued without delay. See id.; see, e.g.,J.V. Peters & Co., Inc. v. Adminis-
trator, EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 264 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding CERCLA barred pre-en-
forcement review, even in absence of express provision); Wagner Seed Co. v.
Daggett, 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986); Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d
2002]
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proposed remedies would debilitate the central function of CER-
CLA and passed SARA to ensure the prompt cleanup of hazardous
waste sites.58
Courts confronted with challenges to EPA response actions
have inconsistently applied section 113(h), disagreeing as to how
broadly the section's bar on jurisdiction should be applied.59 The
provision has been interpreted broadly to provide an unconditional
bar on all challenges to uncompleted response actions and nar-
rowly to permit challenges to response actions that may cause addi-
tional or irreparable harm to the environment.60 This range of
interpretations highlights the competing interests of ensuring a
quick cleanup in order to prevent spreading and further contami-
nation, versus the goal of achieving an effective and adequate long-
term cleanup. 61 The threat exists that some EPA removal or reme-
dial plans may achieve short-term goals at the expense of long-term
goals, by causing irreparable harm to the environment, ineffective
cleanups, and the perpetuation of social problems.62
882, 888 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding it would be contrary to intent of Congress to
allow challenge to EPA removal or remedial action before it is complete).
58. See Healy, supra note 4, at 291. The legislative history of SARA includes
several explicit statements that Potentially Responsible Parties [hereinafter PRPs]
should not be permitted to litigate the issue of CERCLA liability prior to an en-
forcement action. See 132 CONG. REc. S14895 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement
of Sen. Thurmond) ("Citizens, including potentially responsible parties, cannot
seek review of the response action or their potential liability for a response action -
other than in an action for contribution - unless the suit falls within one of the
categories provided in this section."); see also 132 CONG. REC. H9561 (daily ed. Oct.
8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Roe) ("When the essence of a lawsuit involves con-
testing the liability of the plaintiff for cleanup costs, the courts should apply the
other provisions of § 113(h), which require such plaintiff to wait until the Govern-
ment has filed a suit under §§ 106 or 107 to seek review of the liability issue.").
59. See Reiter, supra note 1, at 208 (explaining inconsistency is "due to wide-
spread confusion over the question of whether § 113(h) broadly bars all legal
challenges at ongoing CERCLA [sites] or whether the bar is narrowly limited to
those challenges filed by PRPs intending to postpone their eventual financial
contribution.").
60. See id.; see, e.g., Clinton County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018, 1022 (3d
Cir. 1997) (holding all pre-enforcement challenges are barred); but see, e.g., Reeves
Bros., Inc. v. EPA, 956 F. Supp. 665, 667 (W.D. Va. 1995) (holding constitutional
challenges to EPA remedies may be heard prior to their completion).
61. See Reiter, supra note 1, at 209 (demonstrating element of time is basis for
such tension).
62. See id. "If challenges to enforce all laws are unconditionally barred, then
some CERCLA cleanups may be the source of more problems than they seek to
resolve." Id.
10
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A. All Pre-enforcement Challenges are Barred
A majority of federal courts have applied section 113(h)
broadly, finding that the provision bars all challenges to uncom-
pleted CERCLA remedies. 63 These courts stress the importance of
section 113(h)'s primary objective, the prevention of delays to
ongoing EPA ordered cleanups. 64 Section 113(h) has been found
to bar all statutory and constitutional claims, regardless of whether
they are challenges to CERCLA itself, remedial or removal actions
under CERCLA, or the process through which the proposed actions
were chosen. 65
1. Procedural Claims
Courts have applied the pre-enforcement bar on review of the
process used by EPA in selecting removal and remedial actions. 66
In Schalk v. Reilly (Schalk) ,67 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' assertions that claims challenging
EPA's procedures of selecting a remedial action did not fall under
the 113(h) bar.68 The Court of Appeals stated that "challenges to
the procedure employed in selecting a remedy nevertheless impact
the implementation of the remedy and result in the same delays
Congress sought to avoid by the passage of [section 113(h)] ."69
63. See Healy, supra note 4, at 302; see also Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923
F.2d 1011, 1019 (3d Cir. 1991). The Boarhead court stated:
The limits § 113(h) imposes on a district court's jurisdiction are an inte-
gral part of Congress's overall goal that CERCLA free the EPA to conduct
forthwith clean-up related activities at a hazardous site .... CERCLA's
language shows Congress concluded that disputes about who is responsi-
ble for a hazardous site, what measures actually are necessary to clean-up
the site and remove the hazard or who is responsible for its costs should
be dealt with after the site has been cleaned up.
Id.
64. See Reiter, supra note 1, at 219 (discussing EPA's primary objective).
Courts maintain that § 113(h)'s primary objective is to prevent the delay of EPA
ordered cleanups at ongoing CERCLA sites regardless of whether the plaintiff is a
PRP or a citizen asserting a claim with a citizen suit. See id.
65. For a discussion of courts' bar on pre-enforcement review of procedural,
statutory, and constitutional challenges to CERCLA cleanup plans, see infra notes
66-80 and accompanying text.
66. See Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1096 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding lack of
jurisdiction to consider EPA's failure to comply with National Environmental Pol-
icy Act).
67. 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1991).
68. Id. at 1095. Plaintiffs asserted that their request for an Environmental
Impact Statement was merely procedural and did not fall under the § 113(h) bar.
See id. at 1097.
69. Id. (suggesting challenges to cleanups will result in delays § 113 sought to
avoid). In Schalk, EPA failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Na-
2002] 385
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2. Statutory Claims
Courts are in almost unanimous agreement that the plain lan-
guage of section 113(h) bars statutory challenges to CERCLA re-
moval and remedial actions until they are completed.70 In Boarhead
Corp. v. Erickson,71 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dis-
missed a claim that, if heard, would have impeded a remedial ac-
tion despite the plaintiff's contention that the cleanup activities
threatened archeological artifacts possibly in the soil at the site.72
The Third Circuit found section 113(h) was intended to permit
EPA to "respond expeditiously to serious hazards without being
stopped in its tracks by legal entanglement before or during the
hazard cleanup."73
3. Constitutional Challenges
Most courts have decided that all constitutional claims,
whether they are challenges to CERCLA remedies or the statute it-
self, are barred by section 113(h).74 In Barmet Aluminum Corp v.
Reilly (Barmet),75 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin EPA on due
process grounds from regulating plaintiffs' landfill. 76 The court
found that neither the legislative history nor the statutory language
supported plaintiffs' argument that they could bring constitutional
claims against EPA for its administration of CERCILA or against
tional Environmental Policy Act by not preparing an environmental impact state-
ment for the CERCLA cleanup site. See id.
70. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (citing Con-
cerned Citizens of Agric. St. Landfill, Inc. v. Browner, No. Civ.A.98-0124, 1998 WL
104656, at *6 (E.D. La. Mar. 9, 1998). See also Voluntary Purch. Groups, Inc. v.
Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1388 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding district court did not have
jurisdiction over declaratory judgment action against EPA where § 113(h) clearly
forecloses pre-enforcement review).
71. 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991).
72. See id. at 1023 (denying claims EPA response action violated National His-
toric Preservation Act).
73. Id. at 1019 (noting intent of§ 113(h)). The court, however, did note that
prior to the approval of the expenditure of any federal funds on CERCLA clean-
ups, it must take into account the effect of the undertaking on any district site,
building, structure, or object that is included in or eligible for inclusion in Na-
tional Register. See id. at 1013 n.2.
74. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1339; see also Aztec Minerals Corp. v.
United States EPA, No. 98-1380, 1999 WL 969270, at *17 (10th Cir. Oct. 25, 1999)
(holding district court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims that EPA's actions
pursuant to CERCLA violated due process clause of Fifth Amendment).
75. 927 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1991).
76. Id. (holding district court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin EPA on due pro-
cess grounds). Plaintiff challenged EPA's proposed listing of his property on Na-
tional Priority List. See id.
12
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CERCLA itself.77 Courts have reasoned that an injured party's due
process rights are not violated by CERCLA's pre-enforcement fore-
closure of constitutional challenges because the statute still leaves
open the possibility of a post-enforcement hearing. 78 The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Hanford Downwinders Coal, Inc. v.
Dowdle (Hanford Downwinders)79 went even further, finding the ap-
plication of section 113(h) would not violate the Constitution even
if a possibility existed that plaintiffs' claims would never be heard in
a federal court.80
B. Section 113(h) Does Not Bar All Pre-enforcement Review
In contrast to broad applications of section 113(h)'s bar, sev-
eral courts have expressly or impliedly concluded that, under cer-
tain legal and factual circumstances, review of challenges to
CERCIA and its administration should be available prior to imple-
mentation of the cleanup.8 1 A number of courts have permitted
pre-enforcement review of constitutional challenges to CERCLA as
well as challenges to the administration of CERCLA.8 2 Courts have
also suggested the legality of pre-enforcement review of non-liability
based claims when they raise certain policy considerations.8 3 A mi-
nority of courts have favored immediate review when policy consid-
erations, such as the protection of public health and the
77. See id. at 292 (agreeing with EPA's argument that Congress passed
§ 113(h) to foreclose interpretations allowing pre-enforcement review of constitu-
tional challenges).
78. See id. at 295-96 (noting Congress did not completely foreclose parties
from obtaining review of EPA actions, but merely delayed such hearings).
79. 71 F.3d 1469, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995)
80. Id. In Hanford Downwinders, plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent the
Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry [hereinafter ATSDR] from spend-
ing any further funds on Hanford, a federal Superfund site, until the agency com-
pleted required health assessment of the location. See id.
81. See Healy, supra note 4, at 307. Some "courts have reached different con-
clusions about the extent to which § 113(h) forecloses immediate judicial review of
CERCLA claims . . . with a minority of courts deciding that immediate review is
available because delayed review would be inadequate." Id.
82. See, e.g., Washington Park Lead Comm., Inc. v. EPA, No. 2:98CV421, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8011 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 1998) (holding residents of predominantly
African-American low-income housing project may assert claims of discrimination
and continued segregation against EPA, city and housing authority).
83. See, e.g., Cabot Corp. v. EPA, 677 F.Supp. 823, 823 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (stating
although PRPs cannot rely on exception in § 113(h) (4) to avoid bar against pre-
enforcement review of claim challenging liability, health based claims should not
be barred).
2002]
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environment, the speed of the cleanup process, and the inadequacy
of delayed review are at issue.84
1. All Constitutional Claims are Allowed
In Reeves Bros., Inc. v. EPA (Reeves Bros.)85 and Washington Park
Lead Committee, Inc. v. EPA (Washington Park),86 two district courts in
Virginia held that section 113(h)'s prohibition of pre-enforcement
review does not extend to constitutional challenges of EPA removal
and remedial actions.8 7 The plaintiff in Reeves Bros. alleged that
EPA adopted a practice of warrantless searches of private property
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.88 The District Court for the
Western District of Virginia found that although section 113(h)
clearly prohibits statutory claims, section 113(h) does not extend to
constitutional challenges of EPA actions pursuant to the statute's
commands.89 In Washington Park the plaintiffs brought a class ac-
tion suit challenging a remedial plan endorsed by EPA that called
for the removal and relocation of all privately owned housing and
provided no relief for the residents of low-income areas.90 The Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the ag-
grieved residents could assert claims of unconstitutional
discrimination against EPA based on the selected remedy.91
84. See Healy, supra note 4, at 304 (suggesting there is no clear congressional
intent to foreclose pre-enforcement review of citizen suit claims that are unrelated
to CERCLA liability).
85. 956 F. Supp. 665 (W.D. Va. 1995) [hereinafter Reeves Bros.].
86. No. 2:98CV421, 1998 WL 1053712 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 1998).
87. See id.; see also Reeves Bros., 956 F. Supp. 665, 674 (W.D. Va. 1995). How-
ever, the Reeves Bros. and Washington Park decisions do not have much precedential
value because they are district court decisions within the same circuit and neither
has been followed by other circuits. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1343 (S.D.
Fla. 2001) (finding decisions did not provide adequate support for Plaintiffs'
position).
88. Reeves Bros., 956 F. Supp. at 674. The plaintiff sued EPA and six of its
employees for inspecting his property without ever obtaining consent or a warrant.
See id. at 667-68.
89. See id. at 674 (stating interpretation of CERCLA that prevents review of
constitutionality of EPA's actions would raise serious constitutional questions).
90. Washington Park, 1998 WL 1053712, at *2. The remedial plan called for
removal and reallocation of all residents of privately owned residential property,
while the residents of the Washington Park housing project were to remain in the
cleanup area. See id.
91. See id. at *9 (stating plaintiffs could bring equal protection claim against
site owner for endorsing and implementing potentially discriminatory cleanup
remedy).
14
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2. The First Circuit's Test
The First Circuit, in Reardon v. United States (Reardon),92 devel-
oped a test for determining whether section 113(h) bars constitu-
tional challenges to CERCLA cleanup plans.93 Reardon drew on a
distinction between constitutional challenges to CERCLA itself and
challenges to the constitutionality of the remedy chosen by EPA
under the authority of CERCLA.9 4 According to the First Circuit,
claims of the latter type are outside the jurisdiction of federal
courts, while suits challenging the constitutionality of the statute
are not automatically barred.95 The plaintiff in Reardon claimed
that EPA's imposition of a CERCLA lien on his land without a hear-
ing violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.9 6
The court noted that the claim was not a challenge to EPA's admin-
istration of a remedial or removal action, but rather a constitutional
challenge to the statute itself.97 The court determined that chal-
lenges to CERCLA itself are not barred because Congress did not
express a clear intent to preclude such challenges. 98 However, the
court maintained that "a constitutional challenge to EPA adminis-
tration of the statute may be subject to [section 113(h)'s] strictures
... [we] find only that a constitutional challenge to the CERCLA
statute is not covered by [section 113(h)]." 99
3. Policy Considerations
A few courts have recognized an implicit exception to the gen-
eral jurisdictional bar of section 113(h), arguing that in certain cir-
cumstances a removal of the bar may be necessary to accomplish
CERCLA's ultimate objectives of protecting the natural environ-
92. 947 F.2d 1509, 1515 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc).
93. Id. at 1511 (recognizing distinctions between constitutional challenges to
CERCLA).
94. See id. at 1515. "We see nothing in this discussion which would indicate an
intent to divest federal courts ofjurisdiction to consider a claim that the provisions
of CERCLA itself authorize depravations of property without due process of law."
Id. at 1516.
95. See id. at 1515 (noting literal language of § 113(h) bars challenges to
EPA's administration of CERCLA, not challenges to statute itself).
96. See id. EPA imposed a lien on plaintiff's property in an attempt to recover
costs incurred for the removal of hazardous substances from plaintiffs property.
See id.
97. See Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1514 (stating "the [plaintiffs] due process claim is
not a challenge to the way in which EPA is administering the statute... [r]ather, it
is a challenge to the CERCLA statute itself .. ").
98. See id. at 1515. "We do not believe that the statute expresses a clear con-
gressional intent to preclude the type of constitutional claim the [plaintiffs] are
making. ... " Id.
99. Id. (finding court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims).
2002]
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ment and saving human lives. 100 This minority view does not be-
lieve that the delay of a cleanup plan should trigger an automatic
dismissal of a challenge. 101 "Rather, courts should preliminarily de-
termine whether the cleanup itself or the challenge modifying that
cleanup will more likely cause deleterious environmental and
health impacts." 10 2
In United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc. (Princeton),103 a de-
cision that was eventually overturned, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that it would lift the jurisdictional bar mandated
by section 113(h) if the party bringing the suit could demonstrate a
bona fide allegation of irreparable injury to public health or the
environment. 10 4 The Third Circuit contended that a bar foreclos-
ing review of a health-based claim, prior to implementation of a
cleanup, could not possibly be Congress's intent because it would
violate the purpose of CERCLA. 105 The court distinguished the
100. See Reiter, supra note 1, at 223 (arguing implicit exception should be
applied even if challenge calls into question EPA's selected mode of cleanup).
101. See id. "Ultimately, such an approach will simultaneously serve the gen-
eral objectives of CERCLA and the specific objectives of [section] 113(h)." Id.
102. Id. An example of a remedy that may cause additional harm to the envi-
ronment "may be illustrated by an extreme scenario that has the EPA deciding to
take leaking drums containing a highly toxic substance from a dump site and to
empty them into a nearby lake, thus causing permanent damage to public health
and environment." Silecchia, supra note 41, at 343-44 (quoting United States v.
Princeton Gamma-Tech Inc., 31 F.3d 138, 146 (3d Cir. 1994)).
103. 31 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994) (overruled by Clinton County Comm'rs v.
EPA, 116 F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997)).
104. Princeton, 31 F.3d at 140. The court stated, "[W]e conclude that when
the EPA sues to recover initial expenditures incurred in curing a polluted site, a
district court may review a property owner's bona fide allegations that continuance
of the project will cause irreparable harm to public health or the environment
and, in appropriate circumstances, grant equitable relief." Id.
105. See id. "Indeed, a thorough review of the legislative history reveals no
evidence whatsoever that Congress intended anything other than a judicial review
of completed response actions under the citizens' suit provision." Id. This narrow
interpretation of the scope of review preclusion for health-based claims also re-
ceives inferential support from a house report, which ties Congressional concerns
about litigation delays to its concern that public health will be threatened. See H.R.
REP. No. 99-253, pt. 5 at 25 (1985).
According to that house report:
The purpose of the review preclusion provision is to ensure that there will
be no delays associated with a legal challenge of the particular removal or
remedial action selected under 1040 or secured through administrative
order or judicial action under section 106. Without such a provision, re-
sponses to releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances could
be unduly delayed, thereby exacerbating the threat of damage to human
health or the environment. In a case where delay in implementing the
cleanup would likely result in public health improvements, the applicabil-
ity of the bar against early review is more doubtful.
16
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case from conflicting circuit decisions on factual determinations,
asserting that other courts had yet to be confronted with a bona
fide assertion of irreparable environmental damage resulting from
CERCLA's policies.10 6
Nevertheless, the court's rationale in Princeton was not fol-
lowed, and the decision was ultimately overruled. 10 7 In Clinton
County Commissioners v. EPA (Clinton County),108 the Third Circuit
overruled the central holding in Princeton, and stated, "Congress in-
tended to preclude all suits against the EPA remedial actions under
CERCLA until such actions are complete, regardless of the harm
that the actions might allegedly cause."10 9
However, the holding in Princeton is supported by Cabot Corp. v.
EPA (Cabot).110 In dicta, the Cabot court stated that jurisdiction
should be available for health-based claims immediately after a
cleanup plan is selected.111 The District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania concluded that the citizen-suit exception, sec-
tion 113(h) (4), made the preclusion provision ambiguous and that
the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of permitting early review
of health-based CERCLA, claims. 112 The court's rationale rested on
legislative history, which indicated that Congress intended this re-
sult and only pre-cleanup review would ensure adequate review of a
claim of irreparable injury. 113
106. See Princeton, 31 F.3d at 144 (distinguishing factual circumstances of
Princeton from those of Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir. 1990)).
107. See Clinton County, 116 F.3d 1018, 1025 (3d Cir. 1994) "We are less con-
vinced than was the Princeton... majority, however, that the absolute limitation on
judicial review established by § 9613(h) (4) is either absurd or contrary to the
objectives of CERCLA." Id. at 1025.
108. 116 F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1994).
109. Id. at 1022 (emphasizing when statutory language is clear it is not func-
tion of reviewing courts to act as super-legislatures and second guess policy deci-
sions of Congress).
110. 677 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Pa. 1988); see also Healy, supra note 4, at 306
(citing Cabot Corp. v. EPA, 677 F. Supp. 823 (holding court could not maintain pre-
enforcement suit under § 113(h) (4) where plaintiffs were alleging EPA had failed
to limit costs of cleanup)).
111. See Healy, supra note 4 at 306. Thus the Cabot and Princeton courts shared
the view that in a health-based suit it would be objectionable to permit judicial
review only after the cleanup has been completed. See id.
112. See Cabot, 677 F. Supp. at 828-30 (applying § 113(h)(4) to current
action).
113. See id. at 829 (summarizing relevant legislative history). During the de-
bate that preceded final enactment of SARA, Representative Glickman sought to
foreclose an interpretation of § 113(h) that would permit immediate review of a
claim because it was health-based. See id. Representative Glickman instead com-
pared a citizen's health-based claim to a PRP's premature liability claim and ar-
gued that they are substantially the same because they delay cleanups. See 132
CONG. REc. H9561 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Glickman).
2002]
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IV. NAgurrw ANALYsIs
After determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over Plaintiffs' claims, the District Court of Southern Florida in
Broward granted EPA's and Fort Lauderdale's motion to dismiss.1 14
The court found merit in Defendants' argument that section
113(h) of CERCLA divests federal courts of jurisdiction over Plain-
tiffs' challenge to the ongoing cleanup plan at the Wingate Site. 115
The court rejected Plaintiffs' claim that CERCLA's bar against pre-
enforcement judicial review was inapplicable because their claims
were constitutional challenges. 116 In its decision, the court relied
heavily on Congress's intention in enacting the timing provision,
which was to prevent time-consuming litigation that might interfere
with cleanups of hazardous waste sites.11 7 Despite Plaintiffs' allega-
tions of de jure segregation, the court found that Plaintiffs' claims,
in their essence, were only challenges to the consent decree's ability
to adequately remedy the environmental problems of the Wingate
Site. 1 18
If the remedy has to be rebuilt, the potentially responsible parties may
have to pay twice for the cleanup of one site. Notwithstanding these argu-
ments, the conferees decided to ensure expeditious cleanups by restrict-
ing such pre-implementation review . . . Clearly the conferees did not
intend to allow any plaintiff, whether the neighbor who is unhappy about
the construction of a toxic waste incinerator in the neighborhood, or the
potentially responsible party who will have to pay for its construction, to
stop a cleanup by what would undoubtedly be a prolonged legal battle.
Id.
114. Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1337 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2001). The court
dismissed Plaintiffs' claims without prejudice pursuant to FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b) (1).
See id.
115. See id. The challenge was to the remedial plan embodied in the consent
decree filed in Fort Lauderdale. See id.
116. See id. Plaintiffs relied on Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir.
1991) (holding CERCLA did not deprive court of jurisdiction to hear constitu-
tional challenge to lien); Washington Park Lead Comm., Inc. v. EPA, 1998 WL
1053712 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding § 113(h)'s bar does not preclude constitutional
claims); and Reeves Bros. v. EPA, 956 F. Supp. 665 (W.D. Va. 1995) (holding
§ 113(h) did not bar court's jurisdiction over plaintiff's constitutional challenge to
actions of EPA in executing CERCLA's commands) to support its argument that its
Due Process and Equal Protection challenges could be heard. See Broward, 157 F.
Supp. 2d at 1337.
117. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1338 (stating only relief Plaintiffs sought
was to put stop to remedial action, and such relief would directly interfere with
cleanup plan).
118. See id. Although the Plaintiffs insisted their claims were challenges
under the Constitution only, the court determined they were merely challenges to
a CERCLA-based remedy.
In truth the plaintiffs claims are nothing more than challenges to a con-
sent decree that was implemented under CERCLA. This conclusion is
buttressed by the remedies the plaintiffs seek in their complaint, adapta-
tion of the state's stricter environmental standards, rather than those
18
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The court summarily dismissed Plaintiffs' statutory claims that
Defendants' actions violated Civil Rights Acts and the Fair Housing
Act. 119 The District Court of Southern Florida found unanimous
agreement among the circuits that supported its holding that the
plain language of section 113(h) barred Plaintiffs' statutory
claims. 120 The court primarily relied on Boarhead, a decision that
precluded pre-enforcement review of EPA cleanup plans that alleg-
edly violated the. National Historic Preservation Act.121
The District Court of Southern Florida determined that the
only relevant issue to be decided was whether it had jurisdiction
over Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to the cleanup plan.122
The court found that a split of authority existed on the question of
whether section 113(h) divests district courts of subject matterjuris-
diction over constitutional challenges to CERCLA cleanup plans.123
The court recognized three approaches other courts have taken
when deciding this issue, and analyzed Plaintiffs' claims under
each. 124 First, the court considered the majority view, that all con-
stitutional claims, like statutory claims, are barred by the plain lan-
guage of section 113(h). 125 Second, the court considered the First
Circuit's test that examines a plaintiffs claims and determines
used in the consent decree; a declaration that the actions of the defend-
ants, as embodied by the consent decree, are unconstitutional; and the
prevention of the plaintiffs' exposure to contaminants.
See id. at 1338 n.12.
119. See id. at 1344-45. Counts IV and V alleged violations of Titles VI and
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and count VI alleged violations of the Fair
Housing Act. See id.; see also, supra note 35 for a description of the counts.
120. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1344-45 (asserting plain language of
§ 113(h) bars plaintiffs' statutory claims).
121. See id. at 1338 (citing Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir.
1991); Concerned Citizens of Agric. St. Landfill Inc. v. Browner, No. Civ.A.98-0124, 1998
WL 104656, at *15 (E.D. La. Mar 9,1998) (opinions holding challenges to cleanup
procedures brought under National Historic Preservation Act and Fair Housing
Act were barred by plain language of § 113(h)).
122. See id. At issue were only count I (violation of Fifth Amendment) count
II (violation of Thirteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983), and count VII (vio-
lation of Fifth Amendment). See id. See note 35 supra for description of the counts.
123. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1339 (citing Reardon v. United States, 947
F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991); Washington Park Lead Comm., Inc. v. EPA, No. 2:98CV421,
1998 WL 1053712 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 1998); Reeves Bros. v. EPA, 956 F. Supp. 665
(W.D. Va. 1995)).
124. See Broward at 1338-45 (reviewing parties' arguments, complaint, and rel-
evant case law).
125. See id. at 1339 (citing Aztec Minerals Corp. v. EPA, 198 F.3d 257 (10th
Cir. 1999) (holding § 113(h)'s jurisdictional bar applied to constitutional chal-
lenges to EPA actions); Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Reilly, 927 F.2d 289 (6th Cir.
1991) (holding district court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin EPA, on due process
grounds, from regulating plaintiffs landfill)).
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whether the claims are challenging the administration of CERCLA
or CERCLA itself.126 Finally, the court examined the case in light
of the two district court decisions, Reeves Bros. and Washington Park,
that held the view argued by Plaintiffs - that no constitutional chal-
lenges are precluded by section 113(h). 127
The court noted that the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit had not yet had an opportunity to discuss whether section
113(h) applies to constitutional challenges to CERCLA cleanup
plans. 128 However, the court found Eleventh Circuit decisions that,
at the very least, precluded pre-enforcement judicial review over all
statutory claims. 129 The court noted that the general language used
by the Eleventh Circuit in these decisions supported a broad inter-
pretation of section 113(h), and that the Eleventh Circuit is likely
to agree with other circuits that find that section 113(h) bars judi-
cial review over all constitutional challenges to CERCLA. 30
The court nonetheless refrained from holding that constitu-
tional challenges are barred by section 113(h). 13 1 Because the
court defined the issue narrowly and only asked whether federal
courts have jurisdiction to review a challenge to EPA's administra-
tion of CERCLA, it was not necessary to determine whether the tim-
ing provision barred challenges to the statute itself.132 The court
found that because Plaintiffs' claims were merely challenges to the
126. See id. (citing Reardon, 947 F.2d 1509).
127. See id. at 1342 (citing Washington Park, No. 2:98CV421, 1998 WL 1053712;
and Reeves Bros., 956 F. Supp. 665) (examining constitutional challenges).
128. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1339. However, the Eleventh Circuit
found that such a bar is constitutional. See Dickerson v. Administrator, EPA, 834
F.2d 974, 978 (1lth Cir. 1987) (holding due process does not require access to
courts before final administrative action).
129. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1340 (citing Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d
1548 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over plaintiffs claims brought under Administrative Procedure Act)).
130. See id. at 1341. The Dickerson court stated, "federal courts do not have
subject matter jurisdiction for pre-enforcement reviews of EPA removal actions
pursuant to section 9604." Dickerson, 834 F.2d at 977.
131. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1342. Although the court refrained
from making such a statement, it appeared to support the proposition that all
constitutional challenges are barred by § 113(h). See id.
132. See id. at 1342. The court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that challenges
were more than challenges to the remedial action, stating:
[t] he plaintiffs' complaint repeatedly states that the defendants have im-
plemented a "policy" of de jure segregation, but the plaintiffs can point
to no practice other than the deficient cleanup embodied by the consent
decree. Their present claim is nothing more than a direct challenge to
the Wingate cleanup remedy selected by the defendants ....
Id. at 1344.
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adequacy of an EPA remedy, review would be barred under both
the majority approach and the First Circuit's test in Reardon.133
Finally, the court rejected the reasoning of the two Virginia
district court decisions, Reeves Bros. and Washington Park, which held
that all constitutional challenges could be heard.13 4 The court did
not find Plaintiffs' reliance on the cases persuasive because they
were district court decisions not binding on this court and not fol-
lowed in other circuits. 13 5 The court recognized that Plaintiffs'
claims were similar to those advanced by the plaintiffs in Washington
Park; however, it found the facts supporting discrimination in Wash-
ington Park more severe than those in Broward, and so concluded
this issue did not require a similar remedy. 13 6
V. CRrrIcAL ANALYSIS
The District Court of Southern Florida's interpretation of sec-
tion 113(h)'s bar on pre-enforcement review is a classic example of
a court missing the forest for the trees. 137 The court's determina-
tion that section 113(h) barred Plaintiffs' claims relied too heavily
on the specific goals of the provision and not enough on the gen-
eral goals of the provision and CERCLA itself.13 8 The court should
have interpreted section 113(h) and applied it to Plaintiffs' claims
in the context of the entire statute and not in the vacuum of the
specific provision.' 39 The court supported its decision to bar pre-
enforcement review of Plaintiffs' claims with a narrow interpreta-
133. See id. at 1342. The court stated:
it is not necessary to decide whether the Eleventh Circuit would follow
the reasoning of the Third and Sixth Circuits, which.., bar all statutory
and constitutional challenges, or whether it would adopt the more analyt-
ical approach of the First Circuit in Reardon. This is because the plain-
tiffs' constitutional claims in this case would be barred under either
approach.
Id.
134. See id. at 1343 (observing § 113(h)'s bar does not create constitutional
questions because it is not permanent impediment to judicial review).
135. See id. (noting "Washington Park is the only reported case that has relied
on Reeves Brothers as persuasive authority, and Washington Park has not been cited by
any other reported decision.").
136. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1342-43 (distinguishing Broward from
Washington Park because Plaintiffs in Broward did not claim they were treated differ-
endy than other Wingate residents).
137. See generally Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (focusing on delay that would
result if pre-enforcement review were granted).
138. See generally Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1329. For a further discussion of
the general goals of CERCLA see notes 2-5 supra and accompanying text.
139. See id. at 1342-43 (deciding relief sought by Plaintiffs must be denied
because such relief would directly interfere with CERCLA cleanup plan).
20021
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tion of section 113(h). 140 By focusing too closely on the facial in-
tentions of section 113(h) (the prevention of dilatory litigation) the
court compromised the general goal of the provision and the ulti-
mate goal of CERCLA - the protection of human life and the
environment.14'
It is true that pre-enforcement review would have delayed the
cleanup of the Wingate Site in the short run.142 An inadequate
cleanup, however, threatens the long-term goal of a complete
cleanup, and delays the site's removal from the NPL.143 If the
cleanup is not adequate, EPA will have to repeat the process at the
expense of human health, the environment, and those responsible
for the cost of the cleanup. 144 The court correctly recognized that
Congress enacted section 113(h) to ensure prompt cleanups, but
lost sight of Congress's reason for securing such a goal. 145 If the
court interpreted section 113(h)'s prompt cleanup goal as a means
to protect public health, it would have recognized that the provi-
sion loses some of its effectiveness when it bars pre-enforcement
review of legitimate health-based claims brought by affected
parties. 146
The court ignored the policy considerations raised in Princeton
and Cabot, and answered the question of whether the constitutional
nature of Plaintiffs' claims exempted them from section 113(h)'s
bar. 147 Defining the issue this way, the court missed the broader
140. See generally Broward, 157 F. Supp. 1329 (failing to recognize repercus-
sions of inadequate cleanup plan on human health and environment).
141. See id.
142. See Silecchia, supra note 41, at 374 (implying grant of review would likely
entail injunctive relief).
143. See EPA: How Sites are Deleted from the NPL, at http://www.epa.gov/
superfund/programs/npl-hrs/nploff.htm (last updated Mar. 28, 2001) (stating
only after release poses no significant further threat to public health or environ-
ment can site be taken off NPL).
144. See 132 CONG. REC. H9561 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Glickman) (stating "if the remedy is not adequate the neighbors may be injured
and the potentially responsible parties ... may have to pay twice for the cleanup of
the same site.").
145. See generally Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (failing to recognize ultimate
reason for enactment of SARA).
146. See Healy, supra note 4, at 339 (noting conflict between public health
risks created by cleanups themselves and those created while cleanup is delayed in
litigation).147. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1337-38 (accepting Defendant's argument
supporting dismissal of claim based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to
CERCLA's bar).
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environmental concerns raised by Plaintiffs' claims. 148 As a result,
the court failed to consider whether the remedy was in line with the
goal of CERCLA and if it was the best available long-term solution
for the remediation of the site. 149
Congress enacted section 113(h) to prevent dilatory litigation,
but it was not Congress that took the initiative in the fight against
PRPs attempting to avoid or delay liability and financial contribu-
tion. 150 When Congress constructed section 113(h), it essentially
codified prior court decisions that read into CERCLA an implied
pre-enforcement bar.15 1 These courts believed that such an inter-
pretation would prevent delays in cleanups and further the goals of
CERCLA.152 This interpretation of CERCLA and Congress's later
adoption of section 113(h) has had the desired effect of making
courts and the public more aware of the necessity of prompt clean-
ups and more vigilant of parties trying to delay them in bad faith. 153
The provision, as it has been interpreted, is over-inclusive, because
it bars claims that, if heard, would further CERCLA's ultimate
goals.' 54 It is now time for courts to once again take the initiative
and reverse this trend.
In Cabot, the District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania first recognized the need for a change in section 113(h)'s
application, suggesting that federal courts should have jurisdiction
over health-based claims immediately after a cleanup plan is se-
148. See id. The court discussed at length the impact of the constitutional
nature of Plaintiffs' claims while failing to examine the impact of an inadequate
cleanup. See id. at 1339-44.
149. See id. (failing to make exception for Plaintiffs' health based claims).
150. See Healy, supra note 4, at 289 (noting "Congress enacted § 113(h) to
confirm and build upon existing case law.").
151. See Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1387-88
(5th Cir. 1989) (stating "[s]ection 113(h) ... codified earlier case law limitations
on 'pre-enforcement' review of remedial and removal actions."); see also Reardon v.
United States, 731 F. Supp. 558, 564 (D. Mass. 1990), rev'd in part, en banc, 947 F.2d
1509 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating "[s]ection 113(h), enacted as part of the SARA
amendments, codified this prior case law prohibiting the pre-enforcement review
of EPA cleanup actions.").
152. SeeJV Peters & Co., Inc. v. Administrator, EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 264-65 (6th
Cir. 1985) (finding "allowance of a cause of action prior to a response action
would debilitate the central function" of CERCLA).
153. See Healy, supra note 4, at 352. "The CERCLA review preclusion has
been very effective in meeting its intended purpose - foreclosing the litigation of
CERCLA liability issues prior to a government enforcement action." Id.
154. See Hanford Downwinders Coalition, Inc. v. Dowdle, 841 F. Supp. 1050, (E.D.
Wash. 1993), affid, 71 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding Congress did not author-
ize health-related exception to general jurisdictional bar).
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lected.155 The Third Circuit, in Princeton followed the reasoning in
Cabot, and was willing to lift the jurisdictional bar on review if the
plaintiff could demonstrate that the proposed cleanup plan would
cause irreparable harm to public health or the environment.1 56
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Princeton was fully aware of
the inconsistency and the potential conflict between the general
goals of CERCLA and the specific goals of section 113(h).1 57 Un-
fortunately, the enlightened approach of Cabot has not been fol-
lowed; moreover, Princeton was overruled in Clinton County.158
The Third Circuit in Clinton County was, to an extent, correct
when it stated that Congress determined that delays resulting from
challenges to remedial actions were a greater risk than the risk of
EPA errors in remedial selections. 159 However, Congress enacted
section 113(h) in an era dominated by dilatory litigation, and at a
time when concern for the environment was not as high as it is
today.' 60 In contrast, today the courts and the public are more
aware of the need to protect the environment and of the bad faith
tactics used by PRPs attempting to avoid liability and financial con-
tribution. 16' In light of the changed attitude towards the environ-
ment, the strict application of the provision can be viewed, perhaps,
as an overreaction, a short-term solution to a problem of the
155. Cabot Corp. v. EPA, 677 F. Supp. 823, 829-30 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (addressing
allegations that response plan might harm environment).
156. United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc., 31 F.3d 138, 146-49 (3d Cir.
1994) (arguing review of health-based claims is not barred until at least particular
phase of cleanup is completed).
157. See id. at 148. "An absolute . . . 'bar is contrary to the objectives of CER-
CLA and results in the evisceration of the fight to remedy envisioned by section
113(h) [(4)].'" Reiter, supra note 1, at 224 n.73.
158. See Reiter, supra note 1, at 224. Princeton was difficult to follow and easy
to overrule because it was fact specific and based on policy analysis rather than the
language or the history of the statute. See id. at 224-25.
159. Clinton County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018, 1022 (3d Cir. 1997) (recog-
nizing at time of § 113(h)'s enactment, absolute bar on pre-enforcement review
was Congress's intent, regardless of harms that may arise).
160. See Silecchia, supra note 41, at 368 (referring to 1980s when completed
remedial actions where scarce).
161. See EPA: EPA Office/Program History, at http://www.epa.gov/ocfo/finstate-
ment/2000ar/ar0O_3dec.pdf (May 21, 2001). The public and government's
heightened interest in protecting the environment is evidenced by the large num-
ber of environmental statutes that have been enacted since the passage of SARA.
See id.
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past. 162 Accordingly, a selected lift of the bar will aid in protecting,
not harming, the environment and human health. 163
Nevertheless, reviewing courts should be wary of dilatory tac-
tics. 164 Courts should only permit challenges to proceed after
claimants bear the heavy burden of proving that the litigation is not
a delay tactic or an attempt to avoid liability.165 Courts must weigh
the costs of delaying the cleanup against the added benefit of the
changed plan and also be aware of challenges that only raise a legit-
imate difference of opinion about the preferred remedy for a par-
ticular site. 166
In Broward, the district court passed on the opportunity to in-
terpret section 113(h) in a way that would best reflect the goals of
CERCLA. 167 Although there is little precedent supporting a lift of
the bar, protection of the environment and human health would
have been a good foundation on which to support such a
holding.168
VI. IMPACT
The holding in Broward added to a line of decisions refusing to
create a health-based exception to the jurisdictional bar of section
113(h). 169 In the short run, the Broward decision will make it more
difficult for parties adversely affected by inadequate CERCLA reme-
162. In the more environmentally conscious era that exists today, the imposi-
tion of fines and penalties upon parties trying to interfere with CERCLA cleanups
would provide an effective way to deter dilatory litigation and still allow for legiti-
mate health-based challenges. See Brian Patrick Murphy, Note, CERCLA's Timing of
Review Provision: A Statutory Solution to the Problem of Irreparable Harm to Health and the
Environment, 11 FORDHAM ENvrL. L.J. 587, 621 (2000).
163. See id. at 628 (noting allowing citizens and PRPs to challenge potentially
harmful cleanups would be beneficial to environment).
164. See Reiter, supra note 1, at 224. Courts should review claims brought by
PRPs with heightened scrutiny. See id. at 216-18.
165. See id. at 224-26. If, during pretrial motions, under a heavy burden of
clear and convincing evidence, plaintiffs could demonstrate that the proposed
plans did in fact conflict with the goals of CERCLA, the challenge should be heard
on the merits. See id. at 225-26.
166. See id. at 225. It must be clear to the court that the challenge claims to
modify an ineffective or inferior remedy and provide a potentially better and more
effective choice of remedy, not simply a different one. See id.
167. Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1337-43 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
168. See Murphy, supra note 162, at 619. Courts' selected lift of section
113(h)'s bar on pre-enforcement review could be considered judicial legislation,
but such action is necessary to accomplish the goals of CERCLA until Congress
amends § 113(h) to include a workable and enforceable health-based exception.
See id.
169. Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1337-39; see also, Clinton County, 116 F.3d
1018, 1018 (3d Cir. 1997) (overruling decisions creating health-based exception).
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dial actions to raise legitimate claims challenging specific EPA pro-
posals. However, the decision did leave open the possibility of pre-
enforcement review of constitutional challenges to CERCLA it-
self.170 The court did not adopt the view held by a majority of cir-
cuits that section 113(h) strictly bars review of all pre-enforcement
challenges. 171 The decision can be viewed as a moderate step to-
wards a more analytical application of the jurisdictional bar. 172 The
use of an analytical approach in determining the application of the
bar will ultimately make courts more aware of the advantages of a
selective bar over an absolute bar.173 Their analysis will require a
closer examination of the goals of the statute, and the effects of the
proposed action. A more in depth analysis into section 113(h) will
lead courts to recognize that an absolute bar compromises the gen-
eral goals of CERCLA, and that the best way to protect the environ-
ment and human life is to create a limited, health-based exception
to section 113(h)'s preclusion of pre-enforcement review.174
Robert G. Ruggieri
170. See Broward, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1341-43 (finding it unnecessary to defini-
tively adapt complete bar or First Circuit's test).
171. See id. (noting Plaintiffs' constitutional claims would be barred under
both majority and First Circuit's test).
172. See generally Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991) (en
banc). For further discussion on the First Circuit's test in Reardon, see supra notes
92-99 and accompanying text.
173. See Reiter, supra note 1, at 223-27. (arguing selective bar better serves
ultimate goals of CERCLA).
174. See Healy, supra note 4, at 325 (recognizing inherent unfairness of abso-
lute pre-enforcement bar).
26
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol13/iss2/7
